

7. Increase machine gun and rifle range facilities in Pearl Harbor Area to provide for more effective ground training for personnel of Patrol squadrons based on Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

[4] 8. Provide for torpedo war head storage at some suitable location readily accessible to the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

9. Increase barrack space to provide for increased personnel at Naval Air Station and for personnel of additional patrol squadrons as may be assigned.

(c) For Naval Air Station, Kaneohe.

1. Expedite completion; providing the operating facilities necessary to permit basing and efficiently operating the number of patrol squadrons intended to base thereon, including dredging the patrol plane operating area to the extent recommended, dredging ship channel, housing of the necessary personnel, supplying necessary boats and supplying adequate station personnel. Anticipate engine and plane overhaul facilities to meet War Requirements.

(d) For Kiehl Lagoon.

1. Take necessary steps to expedite the development of Kiehl Lagoon for a patrol plane base.

(e) For Outlying Bases; Wake, Johnston, Palmyra.

1. Expedite completion of operating facilities with particular regard to dredging ship channels; dredging landing and take-off areas; providing gasoline and oil reserves and issue facilities; bomb and ammunition supply and storage; concrete ramps and parking area.

(f) For Midway.

1. Expedite completion and establishment of Midway as an outlying operating base with the assignment of necessary personnel and with facilities and equipment to provide for the basing thereon of two patrol plane squadrons.

(g) General.

[5] 1. Stop the normal shifting and retarding between sea and shore and between other activities of personnel, officer and enlisted, in Patrol Wing TWO, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor and Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, until all personnel complements have been brought up to the requirements necessary for war-time operations.

2. Provide two sets additional beaching gear and two boats fitted with gasoline bowser tanks for use at each of the following outlying bases: Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Guam and Canton.

P. N. L. BOLINDER.

Copy to: Commander
Com. 14
NAS P. H. TH
Prop. C. O. NAS Kaneohe.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 53

Chg. from SECRET to
CONFIDENTIAL by Op Nav
(015723)

PW2/A16-3/
(0003)

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 11, 1940.

Confidential

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: (1) The Commander Aircraft, SCOUTING FORCE.
(2) The Commander SCOUTING FORCE.
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.

1. On November 15, 1940, Commander Patrol Wing TWO ordered a Bomb Loading and Arming Exercise for the five squadrons of this Wing. The Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, was made cognizent of this Exercise in advance and a detailed plan prepared to arm the planes with the service bombs and ammunition now stored at the Naval Air Station.

2. Utilizing all of the available facilities and using the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, as a source of supply for the bombs used in this Exercise, the time element was revealed to be excessively high. Below is a summary of the times involved in delivering and arming with forty-eight each of the 1000 and 500 pound type bombs:

<i>Event</i>	<i>Time required</i>
First bomb delivered to squadrons.....	50 minutes
Last bomb delivered to squadrons.....	2 hours
Fuses delivered to squadrons.....	1 hour 05 minutes
Tail vanes delivered to squadrons.....	1 hour 40 minutes
Time required to arm a twelve plane squadron with four bombs on each plane.....	6 to 7 hours
Time required to belt a complete machine gun ammunition allowance in each squadron.....	4 to 6 hours

3. As a result of this exercise, numerous glaring deficiencies were apparent which adversely affect the condition of readiness for War of this Wing. Such corrective action that is within the capabilities of this Wing, to remedy these deficiencies and to decrease the time element involved, has been taken. However, some of these deficiencies are beyond the control of the wing to correct and should be remedied immediately. These items are discussed in details as follows:

(a) The supply of service bombs of the 1000 pound and 500 pound type available in this area is considered entirely inadequate. The current transfer of one hundred 1000 pound, two hundred 500 pound, and two hundred 100 pound bombs to the Asiatic Station from the ammunition depot, Oahu, in connection with the transfer of the Wm. B. PRESTON and Patrol Squadron TWENTY-SIX, leaves available at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, Lualualei ammunition depot, and on board the U.S.S. WRIGHT a total number of the heavier type bombs sufficient for just 10.2 complete bomb loads for the four squadrons now comprising this Wing. These are distributed as follows and represents all naval bombs within the Hawaiian Area:

	NAS PH	Lualualei	Wright	Totals
1000 lb.....	48	573	61	682
500 lb.....	48	1151	81	1280
100 lb.....	48	2446	314	2808

The above quantities of bombs are not considered sufficient for use in the Pearl Harbor Area alone, and certainly they are woefully inadequate as a source of supply when considering the wide separations of outlying bases from which squadrons now assigned, or scheduled for assignment to this Wing will be required to operate from, and the fact that an adequate supply of bombs should be available at each such base.

(b) The present bomb stowage at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, is inadequate both as to capacity and handling facilities. At present it is necessary to handle the bombs within the magazine entirely by hand. It is urgently recommended that a suitable bomb stowage be provided on the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, to accommodate enough bombs of each type to provide at least one complete bomb load for the number of the squadrons to be based thereon.

In view of the fact that the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor is located on an island (Ford Island) any bombs required by Patrol Wing TWO from the ammunition depot at Lualualei must be transported at some stage of the transportation by water.

Trucks via ferry seems to be far the most practical method of transportation. At present there is only one ferry available for such use. This is not considered sufficient. A total of three ferries is considered desirable in order to make sure that two will be continuously available.

(c) Stowage for ready service machine gun ammunition and pyrotechnics should be provided each squadron such stowage to be constructed in the immediate vicinity of the squadron and with a capacity sufficient to store at least one complete load of belted ammunition for each plane of the squadron and a complete allowance of pyrotechnics.

(d) The Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, has insufficient bomb handling equipment, the following being urgently required: (1) Two electric finger lift cranes (2) additional traveling cranes, preferable of gasoline type, to expedite the unloading of bombs from trucks at the point of delivery. Two such traveling cranes for each squadron is considered a minimum. The above has not been requested by the Naval Air Station. The necessary funds and authorization to purchase these items should be given high priority.

(e) There is a marked shortage of MK IIX Bomb Hoists in this Wing. It is recommended that the supply of Bomb Hoists be immediately increased and that the allowance of Hoists be increased to twenty-eight per twelve plane squadron. At least two additional squadron allowances should be provided for each Wing to provide equipment for use when operating from widely separated bases.

(f) The number of Bomb Skids allowed each squadron is considered inadequate. It is recommended that each squadron be supplied with twelve of the MK X Mod. I Bomb Skids. It is also recommended that each Patrol Squadron equipped for carrying torpedoes be supplied with twelve MK XXXI Torpedo Skids.

(g) The present allowance and supply of machine gun ammunition belting machines is inadequate. It is recommended that this allowance be increased to twelve each of the .30 and .50 calibre type for each squadron and each tender.

(h) It is recommended that the hoisting bands be installed on all service 500 pound bombs are now on hand and that in the future all such bombs be designed with a lifting lug as an integral part of the bomb. It is further recommended that the specification for all bomb crates, tail vane crates, and ordnance equipment, specify standard size AN belts and threads.

4. All of the above mentioned items are considered of the utmost importance as regards Patrol Wing TWO readiness for War and it is urgently recommended that their correction be given the highest degree of priority.

5. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than SECRET.

P. N. L. BELLINGER.

Copy to: (direct) Comdt. 14th N. D. NAS, PH, TH CincUS Comscofor

UNITED STATES FLEET

AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE

A16

U. S. S. HULBERT, FLAGSHIP,
Naval Air Station,
San Diego, California.

(S1)

Confidential

First endorsement to
PW-2 Secret ltr. A16-2/
(0003) of 11 Dec., 1940.

From: The Commander Aircraft Scouting Force.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: (1) Commander Scouting Force.

(2) Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.

1. Forwarded.

2. With reference to paragraph 3 (b), present plans call for the expeditious development of the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, into a primary base for operating and arming patrol planes. Maximum effort should be made to equip that base with every possible facility for large scale arming operations. The supply of ammunition at Ford Island should be limited to one allowance of "ready" ammunition per plane, to be used only when it is impracticable to arm at other bases, or to augment facilities at Kaneohe in an emergency. It should be possible to maintain this comparatively small supply by utilizing only one ferry or in the event of casualty to it, by using small boat or barge transportation. Adequate stowage and handling facilities for the above mentioned ready supply of bombs at Ford Island must be provided.

3. With reference to paragraph 3 (d), it is recommended that all air stations basing patrol planes be adequately equipped to handle ammunition in and at the magazines, to transport it to the operating lines, and to handle it there. When practicable, this equipment should be standardized in order to economize on time

and cost of procurement. The Commanding Officer of the Naval Air Station, San Diego, after extensive study of the problem, has recommended to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance for use at that station, special rolling equipment consisting of units made up of three, low, six-ton trailers pulled by a small tractor, to transport ammunition from the magazines to the operating lines. This type of equipment should be highly satisfactory for use at air stations, including Ford Island, where roads are surfaced and hauling distances are not great. For transportation over longer distances such as from the ammunition depot at Lualualei to Kaneohe, heavy, high-powered trucks are recommended. Recommendations from commanding officers of air stations basing patrol planes, as to the type of equipment required to meet special local conditions should be given careful consideration.

4. Referring to paragraph 3 (e), it is requested that the regular allowance of Mk. III bomb hoists be supplied without delay. An increase in allowance to two per plane with adequate spares is also recommended in order to permit simultaneous loading on both wings.

5. Subject to the remarks in the preceding paragraphs of this endorsement, Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, concurs in the comment and recommendations contained in the basic letter. The inadequacy of facilities at air stations basing patrol planes for the stowage, handling, transport and delivery to squadrons of bombs, torpedoes, machine gun ammunition, fuses and pyrotechnics necessary to equip patrol planes for service operations is a matter of grave concern. The need for remedial action by responsible activities is considered to be of the utmost importance.

6. It is hereby certified that the originator of this endorsement considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than SECRET.

A. L. BRISTOL.

Copy to: COMPATWING 2.

[1] A16/0054/
(0202)

(Chg. from SECRET to
CONFIDENTIAL By OpNav
015723

UNITED STATES FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.,
Feb. 5, 1941.

Confidential

Third Endorsement to
CPW-2 Secret Ltr. A16-3
(0003) of 11 Dec. 1940.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.

Reference:

(a) Cincus Secret 2nd end. to Compatwing TWO Secret ltr. PW2/A5/F41
(0002) of Oct. 22, 1940.

(b) Cincus Conf. 2nd end. to CPW-2 conf. ltr. PW2/A16-3/(022) of
1/16/41.

1. Forwarded, requesting that rectification of conditions set forth in the basic correspondence be undertaken as a matter of utmost urgency.

2. Attention is particularly invited to reference (a) in which the Commander-in-Chief stressed the necessity for decided augmentation of the bomb supply in the Hawaiian Area, and to reference (b) in which he strongly recommended increased ready storage for bombs and torpedoes at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, together with adequate handling and loading equipment.

3. It is absolutely essential that the aircraft of Patrol Wing TWO and one-shore-based carrier group, operating from Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, be able to meet the purpose for which they have been built. The arming and re-arming conditions described in the basic letter are wholly unacceptable. There should be utmost effectiveness of aviation in this area as a vital feature of Fleet readiness. This is alarmingly far from the case now. The situation demands immediate and direct action.

4. The comments of Commander Aircraft Scouting Force in the first endorsement are, in general, sound and are recommended for consideration in connection with the general problem of provision for arming and re-arming at various places.

It is definitely recommended, however, that nothing therein be permitted to minimize or delay the needed action *at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor*, on the recommendations of the basic letter and of the second endorsement by Commander Scouting Force, with which the Commander-in-Chief fully concurs.

5. Prospective developments at Naval Air Station, Kaneohe should be permitted to have no weight toward postponement or reduction of requirements that exist *now* at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor. As has been pointed out frequently in previous correspondence, no development within reason will be in eventual excess in view of the planned great expansion of naval aviation in this area.

6. Earliest practicable information as to Departmental action is requested.

7. By copy of this endorsement, Commander Patrol Wing TWO and Commander Aircraft Battle Force are directed to take immediate steps to develop the best arming and re-arming procedure for Patrol Wing TWO and one aircraft carrier group at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor that can be improvised with facilities and conditions as they now exist, and prior to the full corrective action requested herein. The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is requested to cooperate in this directive.

8. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator, therefore, authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:

Comscofor
Comairscofor
Comairbatfor
Compatwing TWO
Com-14
NAS P. H.

[1] PW2/A16-3/
(0003)

Chg. from SECRET to
CONFIDENTIAL by OpNav
(015723)

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,
December 11, 1940.

Confidential

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via:

- (1) The Commander Aircraft, SCOUTING FORCE.
- (2) The Commander SCOUTING FORCE.
- (3) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.

1. On November 15, 1940, Commander Patrol Wing TWO ordered a Bomb Loading and Arming Exercise for the five squadrons of this Wing. The Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, was made cognizant of this Exercise in advance and a detailed plan prepared to arm the planes with the service bombs and ammunition now stored at the Naval Air Station.

2. Utilizing all of the available facilities and using the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, as a source of supply for the bombs used in this Exercise, the time element was revealed to be excessively high. Below is a summary of the times involved in delivering and arming with forty-eight each of the 1000 and 500 pound type bombs:

<i>Event</i>	<i>Time Required</i>
First bomb delivered to squadrons.....	50 minutes
Last bomb delivered to squadrons.....	2 hours
Fuses delivered to squadrons.....	1 hour 05 minutes
Tail vanes delivered to squadrons.....	1 hour 40 minutes
Time required to arm a twelve plane squadron with four bombs on each plane.....	6 to 7 hours
Time required to belt a complete machine gun ammunition allowance in each squadron.....	4 to 6 hours

3. As a result of this exercise, numerous glaring deficiencies were apparent which adversely affect the condition of readiness for War of this Wing. Such corrective action that is within the capabilities of this Wing, to remedy these deficiencies and to decrease the time element involved, has been taken. However, some of these deficiencies are beyond the control of the wing to correct and should be remedied immediately. These items are discussed in details as follows:

[2] (a) The supply of service bombs of the 1000 pound and 500 pound type available in this area is considered entirely inadequate. The current transfer of one hundred 1000 pound, two hundred 500 pound, and two hundred 100 pound bombs to the Asiatic Station from the ammunition depot, Oahu, in connection with the transfer of the Wm. B. PRESTON and Patrol Squadron TWTNTY-SIX, leaves available at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, Lualualei ammunition depot, and on board the U. S. S. WRIGHT a total number of the heavier type bombs sufficient for just 10.2 complete bomb loads for the four squadrons now comprising this Wing. These are distributed as follows and represents all naval bombs within the Hawaiian Area:

	NAS PH	Lualualei	Wright	Totals
1,000 lb.....	43	573	61	682
500 lb.....	43	1,151	81	1,280
100 lb.....	43	2,446	314	2,808

The above quantities of bombs are not considered sufficient for use in the Pearl Harbor Area alone, and certainly they are woefully inadequate as a source of supply when considering the wide separations of outlying bases from which squadrons now assigned, or scheduled for assignment to this Wing will be required to operate from, and the fact that an adequate supply of bombs should be available at each such base.

(b) The present bomb stowage at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, is inadequate both as to capacity and handling facilities. At present it is necessary to handle the bombs within the magazine entirely by hand. It is urgently recommended that a suitable bomb stowage be provided on the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, to accommodate enough bombs of each type to provide at least one complete bomb load for the number of the squadrons to be based thereon.

In view of the fact that the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor is located on an island (Ford Island) any bombs required by Patrol Wing TWO from the ammunition depot at Lualualei must be transported at some stage of the transportation by water.

[3] Trucks via ferry seems to be by far the most practical method of transportation. At present there is only one ferry available for such use. This is not considered sufficient. A total of three ferries is considered desirable in order to make sure that two will be continuously available.

(c) Stowage for ready service machine gun ammunition and pyrotechnics should be provided each squadron such stowage to be constructed in the immediate vicinity of the squadron and with a capacity sufficient to store at least one complete load of belted ammunition for each plane of the squadron and a complete allowance of pyrotechnics.

(d) The Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, has insufficient bomb handling equipment, the following being urgently required: (1) Two electric finger lift cranes (2) additional traveling cranes, preferable of gasoline type, to expedite the unloading of bombs from trucks at the point of delivery. Two such traveling cranes for each squadron is considered a minimum. The above has not been requested by the Naval Air Station. The necessary funds and authorization to purchase these items should be given high priority.

(e) There is a marked shortage of MK IIX Bomb Hoists in this Wing. It is recommended that the supply of Bomb Hoists be immediately increased and that the allowance of Hoists be increased to twenty-eight per twelve plane squadron. At least two additional squadron allowances should be provided for each Wing to provide equipment for use when operating from widely separated bases.

(f) The number of Bomb Skids allowed each squadron is considered inadequate. It is recommended that each squadron be supplied with twelve

of the MK X Mod. I Bomb Skids. It is also recommended that each Patrol Squadron equipped for carrying torpedoes be supplied with twelve MK XXXI Torpedo Skids.

(g) The present allowance and supply of machine gun ammunition belt- ing machines is inadequate. It is recommended that this allowance be increased to twelve each of the .30 and .50 calibre type for each squadron and each tender.

(h) It is recommended that the hoisting bands be installed on all service 500 pound bombs are now on hand and that in the future all such bombs be designed with a lifting lug as an integral part of the bomb. It is further recommended that the specification for all bomb crates, tail vane crates, and ordnance equipment, specify standard size AN belts and threads.

4. All of the above mentioned items are considered of the utmost importance as regards Patrol Wing TWO readiness for War and it is urgently recommended that their correction be given the highest degree of priority.

5. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than SECRET.

P. N. L. BELLINGER.

Copy to: (direct)
Comdt. 14th N. D.
NAS, PH. TH
CincUS
Comscofor

UNITED STATES FLEET
AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE

A16
(S1)
Confidential
First Endorsement to
PW-2 SECRET ltr. A16-2/
(0003) of 11 Dec., 1940.

U. S. S. HULBERT, FLAGSHIP,
NAVAL AIR STATION,
San Diego, California.

From: The Commander Aircraft Scouting Force.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via:

- (1) Commander Scouting Force.
- (2) Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.

1. Forwarded.
2. With reference to paragraph 3 (b), present plans call for the expeditious development of the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, into a primary base for operating and arming patrol planes. Maximum effort should be made to equip that base with every possible facility for large scale arming operations. The supply of ammunition at Ford Island should be limited to one allowance of "ready" ammunition per plane, to be used only when it is impracticable to arm at other bases, or to augment facilities at Kaneohe in an emergency. It should be possible to maintain this comparatively small supply by utilizing only one ferry or in the event of casualty to it, by using small boat or barge transportation. Adequate stowage and handling facilities for the above mentioned ready supply of bombs at Ford Island must be provided.

3. With reference to paragraph 3 (d), it is recommended that all air stations basing patrol planes be adequately equipped to handle ammunition in and at the magazines, to transport it to the operating lines, and to handle it there. When practicable, this equipment should be standardized in order to economize on time and cost of procurement. The Commanding Officer of the Naval Air Station, San Diego, after extensive study of the problem, has recommended to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance for use at that station, special rolling equipment consisting of units made up of three, low, six-ton trailers pulled by a small tractor, to transport ammunition from the magazines to the operating lines. This type of equipment should be highly satisfactory for use at air stations, including Ford Island, where roads are surfaced and hauling distances are not great. For transportation over longer distances such as from the ammunition depot at Lualualei

to Kaneohe, heavy, high-powered trucks are recommended. Recommendations from commanding officers of air stations basing patrol planes, as to the type of equipment required to meet special local conditions should be given careful consideration.

4. Referring to paragraph 3 (e), it is requested that the regular allowance of Mk. III bomb hoists be supplied without delay. An increase in allowance to two per plane with adequate spares is also recommended in order to permit simultaneous loading on both wings.

5. Subject to the remarks in the preceding paragraphs of this endorsement, Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, concurs in the comment and recommendations contained in the basic letter. The inadequacy of facilities at air stations basing patrol planes for the stowage, handling, transport and delivery to squadrons of bombs, torpedoes, machine gun ammunition, fuses and pyrotechnics necessary to equip patrol planes for service operations is a matter of grave concern. The need for remedial action by responsible activities is considered to be of the utmost importance.

6. It is hereby certified that the originator of this endorsement considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than SECRET.

A. L. BRISTOL.

Copy to: COMPATWING 2.

[1] A16/0054/

UNITED STATES FLEET

(0202)

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP,
(Chg. from SECRET to
CONFIDENTIAL by OpNav
015723

Confidential

*Pearl Harbor, T. H.,
Feb. 5, 1941.*

Third Endorsement to
CPW-2 Secret Ltr. A16-3
(0003) of 11 Dec. 1940.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.

Reference:

(a) Cincus Secret 2nd end. to Compatwing TWO Secret ltr. PW2/A5/F41
(0002) of Oct. 22, 1940.

(b) Cincus Conf. 2nd end. to CPW-2 conf. ltr. PW2/A16-3/(022) of 1/16/41.

1. Forwarded, requesting that rectification of conditions set forth in the basic correspondence be undertaken as a matter of utmost urgency.

2. Attention is particularly invited to reference (a) in which the Commander-in-Chief stressed the necessity for decided augmentation of the bomb supply in the Hawaiian Area, and to reference (b) in which he strongly recommended increased ready storage for bombs and torpedoes at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, together with adequate handling and loading equipment.

3. It is absolutely essential that the aircraft of Patrol Wing TWO and one-shore-based carrier group, operating from Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, be able to meet the purpose for which they have been built. The arming and re-arming conditions described in the basic letter are wholly unacceptable. There should be utmost effectiveness of aviation in this area as a vital feature of Fleet readiness. This is alarmingly far from the case now. The situation demands immediate and direct action.

4. The comments of Commander Aircraft Scouting Force in the first endorsement are, in general, sound and are recommended for consideration in connection with the general problem of provision for arming and re-arming at various places. It is definitely recommended, however, that nothing therein be permitted to minimize or delay the needed action at *Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor*, on the recommendations of the basic letter and of the second endorsement by Commander Scouting Force, with which the Commander-in-Chief fully concurs.

5. Prospective developments at Naval Air Station, Kaneohe should be permitted to have no weight toward postponement or reduction of requirements that exist *now* at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor. As has been pointed out

frequently in previous correspondence, no development within reason will be in eventual excess in view of the planned great expansion of naval aviation in this area.

6. Earliest practicable information as to Departmental action is requested.

7. By copy of this endorsement, Commander Patrol Wing TWO and Commander Aircraft Battle Force are directed to take immediate steps to develop the best arming and re-arming procedure for Patrol Wing TWO and one aircraft carrier group at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor that can be improvised with facilities and conditions as they now exist, and prior to the full corrective action requested herein. The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is requested to cooperate in this directive.

8. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator, therefore, authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:

Comscofor
Comairscfor
Comairbatfor
Compatwing TWO
Com-14
NAS P. H.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 54

PATROL Wing Two

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
23 Nov. 1941.

PW2/A4-4/
(3258)

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

To:

The Commander Patrol Squadron TWENTY-TWO.
The Commander Patrol Squadron TWENTY-THREE.
The Commander Patrol Squadron TWENTY-FOUR.
The Commander Patrol Squadron ELEVEN.
The Commander Patrol Squadron TWELVE.
The Commander Patrol Squadron FOURTEEN.

Subject: Watch and Duty Schedule for December 1, 1941, to January 1, 1942.

Enclosure: (A) Watch and Duty Schedule.

1. Enclosure (A) will be followed as the Watch and Duty Schedule for the period December 1, 1941, to January 1, 1942.

L. C. Ramsey.
L. C. RAMSEY.
By direction.

Copy to:

Compatwing ONE.
Compatron 21.